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Investigation using whole genome sequencing of 
a prolonged restaurant outbreak of Salmonella 
Typhimurium linked to the building drainage system, 
England, February 2015 to March 2016
John Mair-Jenkins1,2,3, Roberta Borges-Stewart⁴, Caroline Harbour⁵, Judith Cox-Rogers⁵, Tim Dallman⁶, Philip Ashton⁶, Robert 
Johnston⁷, Deborah Modha⁸, Philip Monk⁴, Richard Puleston3,9
1. Field Epidemiology Training Programme, Public Health England, United Kingdom
2. European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden
3. Field Epidemiology Service, National Infection Service, Public Health England, United Kingdom
4. East Midlands Health Protection Team, Public Health England, United Kingdom
5. Environmental Health, Blaby District Council, Blaby, United Kingdom
6. Gastrointestinal Bacteria Reference Unit, National Infection Service, Public Health England, United Kingdom
7. Food Water and Environment Laboratory, National Infection Service, Public Health England, United Kingdom
8. Clinical Microbiology, Leicester Royal Infirmary, University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust, United Kingdom
9. University of Nottingham, School of Medicine, Division of Epidemiology and Public Health, United Kingdom
Correspondence: John Mair-Jenkins (john.mairjenkins@phe.gov.uk)
Citation style for this article: 
Mair-Jenkins John, Borges-Stewart Roberta, Harbour Caroline, Cox-Rogers Judith, Dallman Tim, Ashton Philip, Johnston Robert, Modha Deborah, Monk Philip, 
Puleston Richard. Investigation using whole genome sequencing of a prolonged restaurant outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium linked to the building drainage 
system, England, February 2015 to March 2016. Euro Surveill. 2017;22(49):pii=17-00037. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2017.22.49.17-00037
Article submitted on 11 Jan 2017 / accepted on 04 Jun 2017 / published on 07 Dec 2017
Following notification of a Salmonella enterica serovar 
Typhimurium gastroenteritis outbreak, we identified 
82 cases linked to a restaurant with symptom onset 
from 12 February 2015 to 8 March 2016. Seventy-two 
cases had an isolate matching the nationally unique 
whole genome sequencing profile (single nucleo-
tide polymorphism (SNP) address: 1.1.1.124.395.395). 
Interviews established exposure to the restaurant 
and subsequent case–control analysis identified an 
association with eating carvery buffet food (adjusted 
odds ratios  (AOR):  20.9;  95%  confidence inter-
val  (CI):  2.2  –  ∞). Environmental inspections, food/
water testing, and a food trace-back investigation 
were inconclusive. Repeated cycles of cleaning were 
undertaken, including hydrogen peroxide fogging, 
however, transmission continued. After 7  months of 
investigation, environmental swabbing identified 106 
isolates from kitchen surfaces and restaurant drains 
matching the outbreak profile. We found structural 
faults with the drainage system and hypothesised 
that a reservoir of bacteria in drain biofilm and under-
floor flooded areas may have sustained this outbreak. 
Ineffective drain water-traps (U-bends) may have also 
contributed by allowing transmission of contaminated 
aerosols into the kitchen environment. These findings 
suggest that routine swabbing of sink drain points and 
inspection of drainage systems should be considered 
in future outbreak scenarios.
Introduction 
It is estimated that over 38,000 community cases 
of salmonellosis occur annually within the United 
Kingdom (UK) [1,2]. Salmonellosis often results from 
consumption of contaminated food or water [3], how-
ever, transmission via asymptomatic shedding by food 
handlers and exposure to contaminated environments 
where conditions are favourable for pathogen survival 
have also been implicated [3,4]. Here we report the 
findings of an investigation of an outbreak of salmonel-
losis where the environment was pivotal in continued 
transmission.
The event
On 7 March 2015, Public Health England (PHE) East 
Midlands was alerted by the clinical microbiology lab-
oratory of a local hospital to 21 cases of  Salmonella 
enterica  serovar Typhimurium gastroenteritis, with 
onset in February 2015. Seven cases in this initial phase 
of the outbreak required hospitalisation. Following this 
notification we suspected there was a community out-
break of  S.  Typhimurium; investigations and attempts 
to control the outbreak followed.
Hypothesis-generating interviews at the outset of the 
investigation identified that several cases had eaten 
at the same restaurant during the incubation period 
for their illness. Descriptive epidemiological analyses 
including subsequent cases pointed to the restaurant 
being the likely source. This popular, purpose (newly) 
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built restaurant had opened only 18 months before 
the outbreak. The restaurant offered a full table-ser-
vice menu, self-service salad bar and hot self-service 
carvery buffet serving roasted meats (turkey, beef, 
gammon and pork at weekends) and vegetables and 
condiments. Despite interventions to control the initial 
outbreak, cases continued to emerge followed by a pro-
longed period of transmission until 2016. The evolution 
of the investigation into this community outbreak and 
subsequent control measures is described, with spe-
cific reference to the use of whole genome sequencing 
(WGS) to link isolates and the role of the drains in con-
tinued pathogen transmission.
Methods 
Epidemiological investigations
Case finding used information from existing cases, 
local primary care practitioners and pre-existing sur-
veillance systems (statutory disease and routine labo-
ratory notifications, including routine WGS) [5]. Active 
case finding using restaurant booking information was 
not possible as most customers did not pre-book.
Hypothesis-generating interviews and descriptive 
analyses informed a case–control study in March 
2015 where we defined confirmed cases as UK resi-
dents with  S.  Typhimurium infection (with or without 
gastroenteritis) with an isolate matching the nation-
ally unique WGS outbreak profile (five single nucle-
otide polymorphisms (SNP) single linkage cluster 
1.1.1.124.395.395) [6] with symptom onset or a positive 
sample taken within 12 days of visiting the restaurant. 
Possible cases were defined as having gastroenteritis 
(diarrhoea – three loose stools within 24 hours – or 
any two of abdominal pain, fever or nausea) within 12 
days of visiting the restaurant [7,8].
As part of the outbreak investigations a case–control 
study was undertaken, to understand the associa-
tion between consuming restaurant food or drink and 
illness, with the assumption that a food associated 
source was the most likely vector. Cases were recruited 
and were requested to nominate people who had eaten 
with them as controls (1:1 ratio). No other criteria were 
set for control selection. After data collection any con-
trols who met case definitions were reassigned as 
cases. We asked about exposure to food and drink and 
potential confounding exposures: immunosuppression, 
recent use of antibiotics or antacids, age and sex. We 
calculated univariate odds ratios (OR), and adjusted 
ORs (aOR) using multivariable exact logistic regression. 
Figure 1
Reported date of symptom onset of cases of a Salmonella outbreak and people not meeting case definitions with matching 
whole genome sequencing of clinical isolates, United Kingdom, Week 7 (February) 2015–Week 14 (March) 2016 (n = 102a)
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Due to continued case occurrences after the implemen-
tation of outbreak control measures (as informed by 
the findings of the case–control study), further inves-
tigations ensued, including increased scrutiny of the 
environment.
Clinical microbiological investigations
Stool samples were collected for culture and charac-
terisation following clinical investigations and volun-
tary sampling of restaurant staff in March 2015 and 
again following further case occurrences in November 
2015. Positive isolates were submitted to the PHE 
Figure 2
Maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree of clinical (red), sewer (blue) and other environmental samples matching the SNP 
address 1.1.1.124.395.395 of a Salmonella outbreak strain, United Kingdom, February 2015–March 2016 (n = 220 outbreak 
sequencesa)
SNP: single nt polymorphism.
a 114 sequences from clinical isolates (cases and non-cases), this includes sequences where there were multiple samples from cases. 106 
sequences from environmental isolates are shown.
An asterisk (*) denotes the position of a clinical isolate in the tree. The first two asterisks at the base of the tree denote the root of the tree 
and nearest neighbouring sequence.
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Gastrointestinal Bacteria Reference Unit (GBRU) for 
serological confirmation, phage typing and multilo-
cus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA), 
until April 2015. Extracted DNA from isolates was also 
sequenced using Nextera library preparation (Illumina, 
Inc. San Diego, California, United States) on an Illumina 
HiSeq 2500 machine. High quality Illumina reads were 
mapped to the  S. Typhimurium reference genome 
(GenBank: AE006468) as previously described [9]. Core 
genome positions that had a high quality SNP (> 90% 
consensus, minimum depth 10×, genotype quality ≥ 30) 
in at least one strain were extracted and RaxMLv8.17 
(Stamatakis, 2014) used to derive the maximum like-
lihood phylogeny of the isolates under the general 
time-reversible (GTR)-CAT model of evolution. Single 
linkage SNP clustering was performed [9]. FASTQ reads 
from all sequences in this study can be found at the 
PHE Pathogens BioProject at the National Center for 
Biotechnology Information (Accession PRJNA248792). 
Isolates within the five SNP single linkage cluster 
1.1.1.124.395.395 were defined as part of the outbreak.
Environmental investigations and site visits
Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) carried out a 
routine inspection at the restaurant and reviewed staff 
sickness records when the outbreak was first identi-
fied. Surface swabs using Dacron tipped swabs and 
sponge swabs, along with food and water samples 
were collected using standard techniques [10]. Repeat 
site visits and inspections continued throughout the 
outbreak. A food trace-back investigation was con-
ducted to identify the suppliers of meat, eggs, stuff-
ing and gravy to establish if local suppliers were being 
used or whether larger national/international suppliers 
had links to other reported cases or outbreaks of  S. 
Typhimurium.
In November 2015, following failure to control the out-
break, we considered potential environmental sources 
that could provide an ongoing intermittent exposure 
which had not previously been investigated. Repeated 
cycles of cleaning were undertaken at the restaurant, 
including deep cleans using hydrogen peroxide fog-
ging, however these still failed to control the inci-
dent. Further investigations including a Water Fittings 
Inspection [11], sewer sampling using a non-validated 
method similar to a Moore swab [12] and an inspection 
of the restaurant drainage systems were undertaken. 
The drains were visually inspected and microbio-
logical sampling of the kitchen floor drains and sink 
drains was undertaken. Expert advice was sought on 
the movement of bio-aerosols along drainage systems 
[13]. Drainage systems were inspected internally using 
remote cameras, swabbing was conducted and smoke 
testing was used to establish air flows and the integrity 
of the drainage. Repeat inspections and environmental 
swabbing were undertaken after remedial works.
Environmental samples were submitted to PHE Food, 
Water and Environmental Microbiology Laboratories. 
These were tested for  Salmonella  sp. using routine 
detection methods for surface swabs and food [14]. 
Testing methods were adapted for non-routine samples 
including kitchen cloths and spray bottles. Isolates 
from positive samples were referred to GBRU for WGS 
and SNP analysis allowing comparison with clinical 
samples.
Results 
Eighty-two cases (72 confirmed and 10 possible) 
reported visiting the restaurant. The onset of symp-
toms (mainly diarrhoea) ranged from 12 February 2015 
to 8 March 2016 with apparent point source outbreaks 
in February and June 2015, followed by a prolonged 
period of transmission (Figure 1). Four cases (all con-
firmed) worked in the restaurant kitchen or served 
food at the restaurant, two of whom were asympto-
matic (identified through staff sampling).
Table 1
Results of univariate analysis of food items eaten at a restaurant, implicated in a Salmonella outbreak, United Kingdom, 
March 2015 (n = 30 persons investigated)
Food eaten
Cases Controls
Crude OR (95% CI) Exact p value
Total Exposed % Total Exposed %
Carvery 20 20 100 10 5 50 Inda (4.21–Ind) 0.002
Any sharing platter 19 0 0 10 3 30 0 (0.00–0.56) 0.05
Side dish 20 0 0 10 2 20 0 (0.00–0.89) 0.1
Any burger 20 0 0 10 1 10 0 (0.00–Ind) 0.3
Any pie 20 0 0 10 1 10 0 (0.00–Ind) 0.3
Any fish 19 0 0 10 1 10 0 (0.00–Ind) 0.3
Any starter 19 0 0 10 1 10 0 (0.00–Ind) 0.3
Any pudding 20 3 15 10 3 30 0.41 (0.04–3.97) 0.3
Any drink 20 18 90 10 9 90 1 (0.02–21.72) 1
CI: confidence interval; ind: indeterminate; OR: odds ratio.
No cases or controls ate items from the following menu sections: jacket potatoes, light bites, salads, steaks, hero dishes, classic dishes.
a Exact logistic regression, median unbiased estimate univariate OR: 21.37 (95% CI: 2.52– ∞).
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Cases had a median age of 28  years (range: 
5  months–85  years), 65% (53/82) were female and 
99% (81/82) lived in the same county as the restau-
rant. Symptoms were mainly self-limiting although 19 
cases were hospitalised (1 to intensive care with inva-
sive disease). We also identified 31 people during case 
finding whose isolates matched the nationally unique 
WGS outbreak clade but reported not visiting the res-
taurant, and had no apparent link to cases or takeaway 
food (n = 13) or declined interview (n = 18). These peo-
ple did not meet the case definitions, but otherwise did 
not appear different from cases; median age: 28 years 
(range: 10 months – 85 years), 52% (16/31) female, with 
similar symptoms and onset dates, however 19% (6/31) 
lived in other areas of England or Northern Ireland.
Case–control study
At the time of the case–control study, 44 cases reported 
having eaten at the restaurant. Twenty (17 confirmed, 3 
possible) responded to the case–control questionnaire 
(response rate: 20/44). Cases only nominated 10 con-
trols; failing to achieve a 1:1 ratio.
A range of foods, including uncooked salad items were 
investigated in the case–control study (Table 1). Eating 
food from the carvery was the only significant (p < 0.01) 
harmful exposure identified by univariate analysis 
(OR:  21.37;  95%  confidence  interval  (CI):  2.52  –  ∞). 
All cases had consumed carvery food. Multivariable 
analysis identified sex and recent antibiotic use, as 
confounders. The adjusted odds of becoming a case 
remained over 20 times greater after eating any carvery 
food (aOR: 20.9; 95% CI: 2.2 – ∞, Table 2). Effect modi-
fication was not identified between covariates in the 
final model. These results were confirmed by sensitiv-
ity analyses (data not shown). Throughout the inves-
tigation, 94% (60/64) of cases with a known food 
history reported eating food from the carvery; no cases 
reported eating salads.
Clinical microbiological investigations
S. Typhimurium was isolated in 75 case samples (72 
confirmed, 3 possible); stool samples were not avail-
able for seven cases. Phage-type DT193 was identified 
for 16 isolates, 58 isolates were untypable, and one 
isolate was not phage-typed. A single MLVA profile 
was identified (3–14–9-0–0211) in 34 cases (one addi-
tional case had a single locus variant). This profile had 
been associated with human cases and pigs in several 
regions of England (data not shown). In addition WGS 
was available for 96% (72/75) of isolates with the first 
results available 7  days after the start of the investi-
gation, providing increased discrimination over MLVA 
results.
All the isolates clustered within a nationally unique 
five SNP cluster (which is further referred to as the 
outbreak clade), 71% (53/72) of isolates were iden-
tical across their core genome with no SNP differ-
ences observed (outbreak profile). The remaining 19 
case isolates varied from the most frequent genotype 
by between one and five SNPs. An overview of the 
sequences associated with this nationally unique out-
break profile is shown in the dendrogram (Figure 2) 
with sequences from environmental sampling, and the 
additional 31 sequences identified from people during 
case finding who did not meet case definitions (i.e. 
non cases). Eight of 13 sequences from non-cases that 
reported not visiting the restaurant had no SNP differ-
ence from the outbreak sequence. Three sub-lineages 
(Figure 2, marked A–C) which emerged from November 
2015 were apparent. Prior to this, genetic variation had 
been observed, but distinct sub-lineages had not been 
identified, with the exception of three cases in March 
2015 which appeared distinct from the main outbreak 
lineage (Figure 2, marked D). 
Environmental investigations
All routine environmental inspections at the restaurant 
had been satisfactory before the outbreak. Eighteen 
inspections were carried out during the investigation; 
until November 2015 these were inconclusive and 
therefore the restaurant remained open. There were 
no reports of staff illness before the outbreak. Carvery 
food was not available for sampling due to the high 
food turnover, however, raw meat and fresh water sam-
ples were taken at the beginning of each cluster and in 
early 2016 (n  =  21, all negative). The food trace-back 
investigations were inconclusive and did not identify 
any suppliers linked with other cases or outbreaks.
Environmental sampling in the kitchen, restaurant, staff 
rooms, toilets and flats above the restaurant was con-
ducted throughout the investigation, with 354 samples 
collected (Table 3). These were negative throughout the 
early stages of the investigation, but from November 
2015 onwards  S.  Typhimurium matching the outbreak 
clade was isolated from 106 environmental samples 
(Table 3). Isolates from three sewer swabs matched 
the outbreak profile. From November 2015 samples 
taken from cleaning materials, the pot wash area and 
wash hand basins were also found to have isolates 
that matched the outbreak profile. From January 2016 
further areas of the kitchen were implicated along with 
drains (Table 3). The majority of environmental isolates 
Table 2
Final exact logistic regression multivariable model of 
carvery food items eaten at a restaurant implicated in 
a Salmonella outbreak, United Kingdom, March 2015 
(n = 29a)
Exposure
AOR 
 
(95% confidence interval)
P value
Carvery 20.9 (2.2–∞)   < 0.007
Sex (male) 2.7 (0.2–148.6) > 0.7
Recent antibiotic use 1.0 (0.7–63.6) > 0.99
AOR: adjusted odds ratio.
a One case had no record of antibiotic use and was excluded from 
the model (n = 29), model p < 0.005.
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fell into sub-lineages A–C, however several deep drain 
swabs were identical to the outbreak sequence (Figure 
2).
Mapping and visual inspection of the drainage sys-
tems identified significant issues. Water filled traps 
(u-bends) designed to prevent foul air flow from the 
drainage system into the building had failed and 
smoke testing revealed some ineffective drain seals, 
potentially allowing contaminated bio-aerosol to be 
disseminated into the kitchen. One sink drain was not 
connected to any drainage system with waste water 
pooling under the floor. Other larger drains had failed 
after leaking waste-water washed away the support-
ing substrate forming a cavity under the kitchen area. 
It transpired at that point that drainage water had, on 
occasion, risen into the kitchen area, although this had 
not been previously reported. Substantial remedial 
works were undertaken, however, these were found to 
have failed on re-inspection and so these drains were 
later decommissioned.
Interventions
The restaurant responded to the outbreak by rotat-
ing staff away from carvery duties in case they were 
unsuspecting carriers, retraining staff on hygiene pro-
cedures, facilitating voluntary staff sampling, installing 
and monitoring additional hand washbasins, moving 
raw meat storage outside of the kitchen, and conduct-
ing deep cleans of the indoor environment, which over 
the outbreak increased in frequency and progressed to 
include weekly steam cleaning and hydrogen peroxide 
fogging. Cameras were also installed to monitor the 
carvery buffet, following concerns that deliberate con-
tamination may have occurred.
The restaurant voluntarily closed for 2  days for clean-
ing following positive environmental swab results in 
November 2015 and again for several weeks after fur-
ther positive sampling to allow deep cleaning, kitchen 
refitting, and restaurant refurbishment. Remedial 
work was undertaken on the drains in February 2016. 
Capping of all kitchen floor drains and hydrogen per-
oxide fogging followed in March 2016. This appeared 
to resolve issues of contamination. Throughout the 
Table 3
Summary of environmental samples (n = 375) with isolates implicated in a Salmonella outbreak (n = 106) by whole genome 
sequencing, United Kingdom, March 2015–May 2016
Sample date Water samples (n)
Food samples 
(n)
Environmental samples 
(n)
WGS positive isolates within 
five SNP clade(n) Positive sample source
Mar 2015 1 0 26 0 NA
Jun 2015 0 1 16 0 NA
Sep 2015 1 2 27 0 NA
Nov 2015 0 0 19
3 Sinks/wash hand basins
7 Cleaning materials
3a Sewer swabs
Dec 2015 0 0 67
5 Kitchen cloths
2b Sinks/wash hand basins
2b Cleaning materials
Jan 2016 6 9 47
15 Surface and deep drain swabs
4 Kitchen cloths
12a Sinks/wash hand basins
4 Meat sink waste trap
7 Floor swabs
10 Kitchen surface swabs
Feb 2016 1 0 42
19 Surface and deep drain swabs
1 Sinks/wash hand basins
Mar 2016 0 0 41 12 Surface and deep drain swabs
Apr 2016 0 0 59 0 NA
May 2016 0 0 10 0 NA
Total 9 12 354 106 NA
NA: not applicable; SNP: single nucleotide polymorphism; WGS: whole genome sequencing.
a Three isolates matched outbreak sequence (0 SNP difference).
b One isolate matched outbreak sequence (0 SNP difference).
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investigation EHOs and PHE staff remained in close 
contact with the restaurant and provided advice.
Discussion 
Our investigation identified a prolonged outbreak of S. 
Typhimurium linked to a restaurant where 82 cases 
(72 confirmed, 10 possible) had eaten food. There was 
strong epidemiological evidence of a link to the res-
taurant early in the investigation, supported by timely 
WGS results which provided a highly discriminatory 
microbiological link between cases and confirmed an 
initial point source outbreak. In total, 72 case isolates 
and 106 environmental isolates from the restaurant 
clustered into a unique 5  SNP cluster with 61 isolates 
(53 from cases and eight from environmental samples) 
identical at the core genome level. However, the envi-
ronmental link with the restaurant was not established 
until 7  months after the start of the outbreak when 
WGS positive isolates were obtained from the kitchen 
and drainage system.
We found the drains had failed in several places and 
hypothesised that a reservoir of bacteria in biofilm 
[15] and flooded areas in underfloor cavities may have 
sustained this outbreak, after repeated environmen-
tal cleaning failed. Drainage problems in one area of 
the kitchen led to liquid from the drains seeping into 
the kitchen suggesting a contamination pathway. We 
found isolates matching the outbreak strain on kitchen 
cloths, swabs from kitchen sinks, and pot wash areas 
suggesting contact with sinks may have provided a 
second contamination pathway. We also identified 
ineffective drain water-traps potentially allowing the 
movement of contaminated bio-aerosols [13]. Smoke 
tests demonstrated the potential for dissemination of 
foul air into the kitchen.
While aerosolised drain contamination has not been 
previously described in  S. Typhimurium outbreaks, 
there is supporting evidence for this transmission 
pathway for Gram-negative bacteria in hospital drain-
age systems (modelled using  Pseudomonas putida) 
[13]. Bio-aerosol transmission in building drains was 
implicated in a large outbreak of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome suggesting this as a feasible hypothesis 
[16]. Previous outbreak investigations have also iden-
tified the prolonged survival of food-borne pathogens 
such as Listeria monocytogenes in drainage systems of 
food production plants [15,17]. Sinks and drains have 
also been linked with prolonged bacterial outbreaks in 
hospital settings [18,19]. Occult environmental contam-
ination can therefore be difficult to identify and control 
in diverse settings.
There was strong epidemiological evidence that eating 
carvery food was associated with illness, suggesting 
it may have been an important transmission vehicle. 
However, there was no other evidence to confirm con-
tamination of food or utensils, and temperature logs 
suggested food was cooked appropriately therefore 
the cooked food must have been contaminated in the 
kitchen environment if this hypothesis is correct. Direct 
transmission from asymptomatic staff could also not be 
ruled out as not all staff complied with the first round of 
screening. We could not rule out the effect of potential 
lapses in cleaning and kitchen hygiene practices that 
may also have sustained this outbreak. Eating at busy 
weekend periods appeared to be linked to cases in the 
descriptive analysis, suggesting working practices may 
have been less rigorously applied during busy periods, 
even after staff received additional hygiene training 
during the outbreak.
Many of the isolates sampled from drains belonged 
to one of several genetic sub-lineages which 
had evolved from the main outbreak lineage. 
Several  Salmonella  isolates sampled from the drains 
also matched the main outbreak sequence supporting 
the hypothesis that the drains were potentially an 
important reservoir. The kitchen drains and sewer 
system were unlikely to be the original source and may 
have become contaminated by asymptomatic staff, or a 
diner [20]. It is also possible that a one-off contamina-
tion event from raw or undercooked food was respon-
sible for seeding this outbreak as raw meats such as 
pork cannot be guaranteed to be  Salmonella  free, 
although our food trace-back did not find a supply 
chain problem.
We were unable to identify sources of infection or trans-
mission routes for the 31 people infected with the out-
break strain (13 reported no restaurant exposure). We 
considered that some of these people may have been 
unknowing secondary cases, given the national unique 
WGS results, which had not been observed before or 
since this outbreak, and also that asymptomatic car-
riage was observed during the outbreak, however no 
epidemiological links to outbreak cases with restau-
rant exposure were identified.
Strengths and limitations
A key strength of this investigation was the use of 
routine WGS which strengthened the epidemiological 
evidence of a point-source outbreak enabling rapid 
implementation of control measures before a holiday 
weekend in March 2015. However, there were also a 
number of limitations. Early cases noted their suspi-
cions of the restaurant on social media which may have 
introduced recall bias in our case–control study, inflat-
ing measures of association. The analytical study had a 
poor response rate and a small sample size. This possi-
bly introduced type II error for other food exposures or 
potential confounders which may partially explain why 
other foods were not identified as potential sources of 
infection even though contamination in the kitchen was 
possible. Our analysis plan excluded protective food 
exposures potentially increasing residual confounding 
in our final model.
Other information biases may have been present in this 
investigation as many cases were identified after the 
hypothesis had been established, potentially leading 
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to over ascertainment of exposure at the restaurant. 
However, the investigation did not identify a common 
source other than the restaurant, no other outbreaks 
with the unique profile have been identified and since 
the drainage issues have been resolved, no further 
cases have been identified.
Evidence of environmental contamination was lacking 
before November 2015. This was possibly due to the 
lower density and frequency of sampling or the tech-
niques used, although it is unclear if these or other fac-
tors resulted in inconclusive findings.
Implications for public health
Salmonella  outbreaks are commonly linked to food, 
restaurants and water supplies [21-26]. Biofilm may 
harbour  Salmonella  sp. in drains and long-term 
environmental contamination is possible [3], but rarely 
reported nor is the potential for bio-aerosol related 
contamination. Our findings suggest greater considera-
tion should be given to undertaking drain swabbing at 
an early stage of restaurant and food related outbreak 
investigations. This will enable identification of simi-
larities between environmental and clinical isolates 
that may have previously not been possible before the 
routine use of highly discriminatory WGS.
This outbreak was unexpected in a newly built restau-
rant managed by a national chain. Defective drains 
may have been a one-off incident. However, repeated 
failures of drains and continued contamination of 
the kitchen identified here suggests the design and/
or installation of drainage systems was suboptimal. 
Increased inspections in the building process may be 
required. Consideration should be given to drainage 
systems which facilitate inspection of water-traps or 
use of multiple traps should be considered to reduce 
the impact of failure.
Conclusions
This outbreak of a nationally unique strain 
of  S.  Typhimurium was linked to a single restaurant. 
The defective drainage system in the restaurant may 
have acted as an environmental reservoir and dissemi-
nation of bio-aerosol from the drains into the kitchen 
was plausible. This linked with possible lapses in 
kitchen hygiene may have enabled intermittent con-
tamination of food during the period of the outbreak. 
While the original source remains unclear, this pro-
tracted outbreak was controlled after remedial work on 
the drains, a kitchen and restaurant refurbishment and 
a deep clean involving hydrogen peroxide fogging.
Public health professionals should consider drainage 
systems and bio-aerosols as potential sources in any 
outbreak of salmonellosis and environmental investi-
gations should include swabbing drains early in out-
break scenarios. Investigators should work towards 
accessing timely WGS analysis, which in this inves-
tigation was essential for case finding, establishing 
a single most probable source and underpinning the 
epidemiological evidence used to demonstrate a need 
for actions to prevent further cases.
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